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Abstract 
Purpose: We examine the impact of a firm’s corporate governance mechanisms on the 
number of financial analysts following UK firms. We also examine the potential effect of the 
number of analyst following firms in the United Kingdom (UK) on the association between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm value.    
 
Methodology: We use multiple regression models to examine the association between 
corporate governance, analyst coverage and firm value for a large sample of UK firms listed 
in London Stock Exchange with financial year-ends between January 2003 and December 
2008. 
 
Findings: We find that the aggregate level of corporate governance quality is positively 
associated with the number of analysts following UK firms. We also find that compensation 
score is the main component that affects the number of analysts following UK firms. Our 
results suggest that financial analysts are particularly concerned with how much 
compensation that executives and directors receive. This is consistent with Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) who argue that CEO compensation can be used as effective mechanisms for 
mitigating agency costs. Hence higher levels of CEO compensation attract attracts more 
financial analysts to follow the firm. Surprisingly, when we examine the joint effect of both 
corporate governance quality and the number of analysts following on firm value, we find no 
significant effect for both variables on firm value.   
 
Originality: We contribute to prior research by providing the first empirical evidence on the 
impact of disaggregated levels of corporate governance on analysts following and firm value 
for a large sample of UK firms.  
 
 
Keywords: corporate governance; analyst following, firm value, United Kingdom. 
 
Classification: Research paper. 
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1. Introduction 
The present paper aims to examine the effect of a firm’s corporate governance (CG) 
mechanisms on the number of analysts following UK firms. It also examines the potential 
impact of analysts following UK firms on the association between CG mechanisms and firm 
value. The study uses the agency theory to examine these associations.  
Based on the agency theory, the existence of high quality CG mechanisms should 
mitigate the agency costs in the relation between the principal (shareholders) and their agents 
(managers) (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). High quality CG mechanisms are highly valued by 
the stock market. For example, prior research finds that CG is a key determinant for firm 
valuation (Lang et al, 2003), cost of equity (Bowen et al, 2006), market liquidity (Roulstone, 
2003) and firms ‘credit ratings (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al (2006).  
Another stream of literature studies on the usefulness of CG mechanisms to the stock 
market tend to focus on financial analysts. This is because financial analysts are widely 
considered to be a very influential user group in stock markets. They represent and influence 
investors’ believes and activities (e.g., Schipper, 1991; Hirst et al., 1995; and Lang and 
Lundholm, 1996). This line of research finds that CG affects the accuracy of analyst forecasts 
(Bhat et al, 2006 and Byard et al, 2006); the number of analysts following firms and firm 
value (Lang et al., 2004; Haw et al., 2004; Yu, 2007 & 2010 and Boubaker and Labegorre, 
2008). On the current study, we extend this line of literature by examining the association 
between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value in the UK. 
The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code was introduced by the 
Cadbury Committee In 1992; its paragraph 2.5 is still the classic definition of the context of 
the Code (FRC, 2010): 
“Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. The 
shareholders’ role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the 
board include setting the company’s strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship. The board’s actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in 
general meeting”. 
  
The present paper utilizes the unique UK regulatory framework in which it combines 
high standards of corporate governance with relatively low associated costs (FRC, 2006). In 
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addition, it is argued that the UK outperforms other countries in terms of governance 
standards, while compliance costs are estimated to be lower in the UK compared to other 
countries with comparable standard (FRC, 2006). This context enables the present study to 
contribute to existing corporate governance research by examining whether corporate 
governance mechanisms affect analyst following and firm value.  
This research is important for its potential policy implications. It helps to inform 
regulators (and managers) about the benefits of improving the quality of corporate 
governance mechanisms to firms.  In this way it provides part of the information needed for a 
more cost-benefit analysis of the use of different corporate governance mechanisms by UK 
firms. We test to see if levels of corporate asymmetric information (measured by the number 
of analysts following UK firms) can be reduced through corporate governance mechanisms. 
We also test the joint effect of both corporate governance mechanisms and the number of 
analysts following on UK firm value.  
Analyst following is considered as one of the most important determinants of 
corporate valuation (i.e., Claessens et al, 2002; Lang et al, 2003), the cost of equity capital 
(i.e., Bowen et al., 2008), market liquidity (i.e., Attig, et al. 2006), and dividend payment 
decision (i.e., Basiddiq and Hussainey, 2010). In addition, prior research finds that firms with 
high quality corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be followed by a large 
number of financial analysts and that higher analyst following is associated with higher 
valuation for firms facing governance problems (Lang et al, 2004).  Lang et al (2004) is the 
first to study the association between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value 
in the UK. Their analysis was focus on a sample of 638 firms with financial year ends on 
1996. However, they did not examine a full set of corporate governance mechanisms.  
Another stream of research in the UK examines the association between corporate 
governance and corporate voluntary disclosure (i.e. Hussainey and Al-Najjar, 2010; 
Hussainey and Wang, 2010; Li, et al, 2008). However, these studies use the level of 
corporate disclosure as a proxy for the number of financial analysts following UK firms.  In 
addition, they limit their analysis to a subset of corporate governance mechanisms. 
In the present paper, we respond to a recent call for research that explains the impact 
of corporate governance mechanisms on analyst following for a longer time period and larger 
sample size (Yu, 2010). In particular, we investigate whether firms that possess strong 
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internal and external corporate governance mechanisms have better capital market 
performance as a result of more analysts’ following and better firm value relative to firms 
with weak corporate governance mechanisms. We contribute to corporate governance 
research by offering new evidence on the association between corporate governance, analyst 
following and firm value for a large sample of UK firms. An important feature of this paper 
is that it uses data of the largest corporate governance data provider to institutional investors, 
Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) offered by RiskMetrics Group. This database 
contains 55 CGQ governance factors which span eight categories of corporate governance 
including board, compensation, takeover and audit. We use an overall measure of corporate 
governance quality score as well as individual sub-scores to examine which CGQ governance 
factors are significantly associated with analyst following and firm value for UK firms. 
Using a sample of 1514 UK listed firms; we find that there is a positive association 
between the quality of overall corporate governance mechanisms and the number of financial 
analysts covering UK firms. This suggests that financial analysts have greater incentives to 
follow better-governed UK firms. However, we find that not all corporate governance 
mechanisms affect analyst following. In particular, we find that compensation mechanism is 
the only significant variable in all regression models. In addition, following Lang et al. 
(2004) we use a regression model that takes into account the endogeneity between analyst 
following and firm value. However, we find no valuation effect when financial analysts 
cover UK firms with good corporate governance mechanisms. This suggests that financial 
analysts serve as a monitoring device and act as substitute mechanism for corporate 
governance when valuing firms.  
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews relevant literature and 
develops our research hypotheses. Section 3 describes data and the sample selection. Section 
4 describes the research design. Section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes 
and suggests lines for further research.   
 
2. Relevant Literature and Hypotheses  
2.1 Analyst following and corporate governance 
There are three reasons why quality of corporate governance may affect the number 
of analysts following the company.  First of all, Fan and Wong (2002) and Willekens et al. 
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(2005) argue that firms tend to disclose a better quality information if they implement 
effective corporate governance mechanisms. This will consequently reduce the cost for an 
analyst to follow such firms.  Second, firms with effective corporate governance mechanisms 
are more able to directly monitor their managers, which in turn, align the managers’ interests 
with the shareholders’ interests and reduce the agency problem arising from the separation of 
ownership.  
Third, McNichols and O’Brien (1997) argue that analysts allocate their efforts on the 
basis of their expectations of the firm’s future performance and they are inclined to add firms 
they view favourably. Klapper and Love (2004) and Durnev and Kim (2005) suggest that 
analysts prefer to follow better-governed firms because they are associated with better 
management, and hence better future economic viability. For the above three reasons, we 
expect a positive association between the number of analyst following and the quality of 
corporate governance. Our first hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H1: Analyst following is positively associated with the quality of corporate governance. 
2.2 Analyst following, corporate governance and firm value 
There is an important role for financial analysts in conveying firms’ performance to 
the market. Analysts substitute for corporate governance and play a governance role in the 
market. This substitution effect has been documented by two recent studies. Lang et al. 
(2004) provided evidence that the negative effect of lower investor protection on valuation is 
mitigated when analyst following is greater. Knyazeva (2007) finds that analysts substitute 
corporate governance in their impact on firm performance. 
If the number of analyst following plays a disciplinary role on misbehaving managers 
and rewards value creation, the presence of internal governance mechanisms should lower 
the marginal benefit of more analyst following, and vice versa. Hence, we anticipate a 
negative joint impact of analyst following and corporate governance on valuation. Our 
second hypothesis is stated as follows: 
H2: The relation between the quality of corporate governance and valuation is less 
pronounced for firms with greater analyst following than for firms with lower analyst 
following.  
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3. Data and Sample 
Our sample of companies comprises the FTSE All Share constituent firms. Corporate 
governance data is collected from the largest corporate governance data provider to 
institutional investors, Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ) supplied by RiskMetrics 
Group. CGQ provides corporate governance ranking for more than 7,500 firms worldwide 
since 2003. Therefore, we our sample period starts with 2003. Year 2008 is the most recent 
year at the time of undertaking the analysis of the present paper. This database contains 55 
CGQ governance factors which span eight categories of corporate governance including 
board, compensation, takeover and audit. Table 1 provides a summary of corporate 
governance ratings variables provided by RiskMetrics. .  
Insert Table 1 here 
Analyst following data is collected from FactSet, a unique dataset provided by 
FactSet Research Systems Inc., which provides analytics to investment professionals to 
download, combine, and manipulate financial data for insight into global market including 
UK stock market. We merge the analyst following data with corporate governance data using 
companies’ Sedol numbers.  We merge 2852 firm-year observations for the number of 
analyst following with 2514 firm-year observations from QCG using Sedol numbers. This 
leads to an initial sample of 1577 firm-year observations. 
To test hypothesis H1, we use the natural logarithm of total assets as a proxy for firm 
size. We collect total assets from Worldscope (item no. WC02999). We remove firms with 
missing total assets data, this ends up with a sample of 1514 firm-year observations (see 
Panel A in Table 2).  
To test hypothesis H2, we collect accounting data from Worldscope. In particular, we 
calculate Tobin’s Q as total assets (Worldscope item WC02999) less the book value of equity 
(Worldscope item WC05476) multiplied by the number of shares outstanding plus the market 
value of equity (MV) divided by total assets. We use Total debt (Worldscope item  
WC03255) to compute total Debt/total Assets ratio (DA) and Capital expenditure 
(Worldscope item  WC04601) to compute  Capital expenditure/Total Assets  ratio (CA). We 
remove firms with missing accounting data, this leads to a sample of 1505 firm-year 
observations (see Panel B in Table 2).  
Insert Table 2 here 
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4. Research Design 
4.1 Models employed to test H1 
To test H1, we employ the following model:   
iiii SizeaCGaaFollowing  210                                                                         (1) 
Where:  
Following is defined as the number of analysts following UK firms collected from FactSet dataset. 
CG is the aggregated CG ranking provided by CGQ.  
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets  
CGQ also provides sub-scores for each firm in four particular governance areas; 
board, takeover defences, executive and director compensation and ownership, and audit. 
These subs-cores are expressed in numbers from 1-5 (5 indicates firm in the top quintile in a 
governance area while 1 indicates firm is in the bottom quintile in a governance area).  
In order to understand which of these components better explains the number of 
analyst following, we run model (1) by replacing the overall ranking of corporate governance 
with sub-scores pertaining to different aspects of corporate governance. We expect a positive 
sign with each individual corporate governance variable. That is we expect b1 through b4  to 
be positive in the following model: 
iiiiiii SizebAuditbTakeoverbonCompensatibBoardbbFollowing  543210  (2) 
Where:  
Following is defined as the number of analysts following UK firms collected from FactSet dataset. 
Board is the Board Composition sub-score 
Composition is the Executive and Director Composition sub-score 
Takeover is the Anti-Takeover Provisions sub-score 
Audit is Audit committee/Audit fees/Audit Rotation/Auditor Ratification sub-score 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets  
Moreover, we construct another aggregate measure of corporate governance (NCG) 
from the addition of the four sub-scores (Board+Compensation+Takeover+Audit) and re-run 
regression (1) as follows: 
iiii SizecNCGccFollowing  210                                                                (3) 
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We control for firm size in the above three models using the natural logarithm of total 
assets (in £ millions). Based on prior literature (e.g., Lang et al. 2003, 2004), we expect a 
positive sign for Size. 
 
4.2 Models employed to test H2 
With a slight modification to Lang et al. (2004) to accommodate corporate 
governance variables, we run the following regression model: 
Tobin’ iiiiiiii CAdDAdSizedgCGFollowindFollowingdCGddQ  6543210   (4) 
Tobin’s Q is used to proxy for the market valuation of assets and is computed as total 
assets less the book value of equity plus the market value of equity divided by total assets. 
CG is measured by the corporate governance ranking published by QCG. Analyst following 
(Following) is defined as in equation (1). 
In model 4, we use three control variables. Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. 
Size is expected to be positively related to Tobin’s Q.  To control for the possibility that 
creditors are able to lessen managerial agency problems or that debt provides valuable tax 
shields, we use the ratio of total debts to total assets (DA).  We control for firm’s potential 
investment opportunities using the ratio of capital expenditure to total assets (CA). We 
expect both DA and CA to have a positive sign (Lang et al., 2004). 
We use another variable, (NCG), as a proxy for the quality of corporate governance 
which is the sum of the four dimensions (Board, Following, Compensation, and Audit), and 
we re-run the following new model: 
Tobin’ iiiiiiii TAhDAhSizehngNCGFollowihFollowinghNCGhhQ  6543210   (5) 
We further partition NCG into its components and use each of this component one at 
a time instead of NCG in equation (5), to examine which of these components has more 
impact on firm value. The results are reported in columns (7-13) of Table 8. We expect these 
components to have a positive impact on firm value. Based on hypothesis H2, we expect the 
coefficients of both d3 and h3 to be negative and significant. 
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5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Analyst following and corporate governance 
Table 3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the regression models. 
The number of analyst following ranges from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 43 with 
a median of 9 which indicates that 50% of firms have less than 9 analysts following. The 
Corporate governance ranking (CG) has a high average of 85.664 and a median of 87.8 
which shows that majority of firms in the sample are of high corporate governance quality 
which is expected given that all firms in CGQ are included in MSCI EAFE index. The 
second measure of corporate governance (NCG) ranges from 6 to 20 with a median of 18 
which again confirms the lower cross sectional variation in corporate governance quality due 
to sample bias to high quality corporate governance firms. The four sub-scores of corporate 
governance ranges from 1 to 5 with a median of 5 for Board, Takeover, and Audit and a 
median of 4 for compensation. This indicates a higher level of cross sectional variation in 
Compensation compared to the three remaining components of corporate governance. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between the variables used in the 
regression models (1, 2 and 3). It can be noticed that there are significant relationship 
between all the variables in the regression models apart from the relationship between 
Compensation and both Takeover and Size. 
Insert Table 4 here 
Tables 5 & 6 show the empirical results related to hypothesis 1. Table 5 reports the 
results without using year dummies; while Table 6 shows the results after the inclusion of 
year dummies in the regression models. The results reported in columns (1-4) show that there 
is positive impact for the quality of corporate governance on analyst following with a 
coefficient of 0.701 on NCG which is significant at 1% level of significance. Adding size to 
the model in column (4) increases the explanatory power of the model as measured by 
adjusted R-squared from 3.34% to 33.75% but reduces the coefficient on NCG to 0.419 
although it remains significant at 1% level of significance. Columns (5-8) show that 
corporate governance components have a significant impact on analyst following but only 
negative in the case of Takeover. When regress all corporate governance components on 
analysts following (model 10), we find that Board, compensation, and takeover are 
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significant while Audit is the only insignificant. When Adding Size to the model in column 
(11) only Board and compensation remain significant and the explanatory power of the 
model noticeably increased to 33.98%. Given the significant correlation between Board and 
Size, model 13 suggests Compensation and Size are the main factors that determine the 
number of analysts following. This finding implies that analysts are particularly concerned 
about how much compensation that executives and directors receive. The results in Table 5 
are consistent with the correlation analysis in Table 4.  
.The positive association between analyst following and corporate governance quality 
in the UK is consistent with Yu (2007, 2010) findings for common law countries which UK 
belongs to. This indicates that analysts play a more active role in countries with stronger 
investor protection and more effective legal systems (Chang et al. (2000); Barnive et al. 
(2005)). 
Insert Tables 5 & 6 here 
 
5.2 Analyst following, corporate governance and firm value 
Table 7 shows descriptive statistics of the variables used to test hypothesis 2. The 
average number of analysts following a firm is 10.223. The firm with the largest analyst 
following is covered by 43 analysts and the firm with the smallest number of analyst 
following is covered by zero analysts. The mean of corporate governance ranking (CG) is 
85.682 with a standard deviation of 11.754. These rankings range from 0 to 100, with a 
median of 87.9, the 25th percentile of 80, and the 75th percentile of 94.2 which indicates that 
the sample is dominated with high quality corporate governance. This is expected given that 
the sample is covered by MSCI EAFE index.  The mean of Tobin’s Q is 0.501, with a 
standard deviation of 2.123. It ranges from -45.808 to 3.491, with a median of 0.642, the 25th 
percentile of 0.450 and the 75th percentile of 0.775. 
Insert Table 7 here 
Table 8 provides the correlation coefficients among the variables. First, CG is 
positively associated with Tobin’s Q while is NCG is negatively associated with Tobin’s Q 
and the same applies for its four components apart from Audit. Size and DA are the only 
variables with significant relation with Tobin’s Q.  
Insert Table 8 here 
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Column 2 in Table 9 shows that CG and Following come with the expected positive 
sign but insignificant coefficients. This positive relationship is consistent with Lang et al. 
(2003), Klapper and Love (2004), Lang et al. (2004). The results from corporate governance 
components in columns (11) and (13) are similar. In the models without interaction terms (in 
unreported results), Following has a significant impact on firm valuation but of the wrong 
sign (negative). Moreover, Size is the only variable that is persistently significant in all 
models.  
Table 9 provides empirical test on the conjecture that the positive market valuation 
effect of corporate governance is conditional on the number of analyst following.  The results 
in column (2) and (4) support H2. As expected, the interaction term CGFollowing and 
NCGFollowing has a negative coefficient but it is insignificant. This is inconsistent with Yu 
(2007) who find positive but still insignificant coefficient. 
Insert Table 9 here 
 
6. Conclusion 
Our paper builds on literature that investigates the link between corporate 
governance, analysts following and firm value. We extend this work in four important ways. 
First, we investigate the association between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
number of analysts following UK firms. In particular, we examine the extent to which better 
corporate governance quality attracts more financial analysts for covering UK firms. Second, 
we try to identify which component of corporate governance is more likely to affect analysts 
following. Third, we test the joint effect of corporate governance mechanisms and analysts 
following on UK firm value. Finally, we study the effect of different corporate governance 
sub-categories on firm value in the presence of analysts following. 
The paper uses a sample of 1514 UK firms listed in London Stock Exchange. It finds 
that the overall level of corporate governance quality is positively associated with the number 
of analysts following UK firms. Among the four individual components of corporate 
governance, we find that compensation score seems to be the main component that affects 
analyst following. Our paper also shows that both better corporate governance quality and 
greater analyst following have no significant effect in enhancing UK firm value. Our results 
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add to the understanding of the expected role of financial analysts as additional monitoring 
mechanism in the stock market.  
An interesting issue for future work would be to examine the extent to which the 
quality of corporate governance mechanisms affect financial analysts’ stock 
recommendations (i.e. buy, sell or hold) and their earnings forecasts accuracy.  In addition, it 
is worth to investigate the extent to which financial analysts actually use corporate 
governance information in reports. Using a content analysis approach, researchers can 
identify which CG mechanisms are reported in analysts reports and the extent to which these 
mechanisms are important for the stock market participants (i.e. current and future investors). 
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Table 1: Ratings Variables Summary  
Board  Anti-Takeover Provisions  
1  Board Composition  34  Anti-Takeover Provisions Applicable Under Country (local) Laws  
2  Nominating Committee  Executive and Director Compensation  
3  Compensation Committee  35  Cost of Option Plans  
4  Governance Committee  36-37  Option Re-pricing  
5  Board Structure  38  Shareholder Approval of Option Plans  
6  Board Size  39  Compensation Committee Interlocks  
7  Changes In Board Size  40  Director Compensation  
8  Cumulative Voting  41  Pension Plans For Non-Employee Directors  
9  Boards Served On – CEO  42  Option Expensing  
10  Boards Served On – Other Than CEO  43  Option Burn Rate  
11  Former CEO’s  44  Corporate Loans  
12  Chairman/CEOs Separation  Progressive Practices  
13  Board Guidelines  45  Retirement Age for Directors  
14  Response To Shareholder Proposals  46  Board Performance Reviews  
15  Board Attendance  47  Meetings of Outside Directors  
16  Board Vacancies  48  CEO Succession Plan  
17  Related Party Transactions  49  Outside Advisors Available to Board  
Audit  50  Directors resign upon job change  
18  Audit Committee  Ownership  
19  Audit Fees  51  Director Ownership  
20  Auditor Rotation  52  Executive Stock Ownership Guidelines  
21  Auditor Ratification  53  Director Stock Ownership Guidelines  
Charter/Bylaws  54  Officer and Director Stock Ownership  
22-27  Features of Poison Pills  Director Education  
28-29  Vote Requirements  55  Director Education  
30  Written Consent   
31  Special Meetings   
32  Board Amendments   
33  Capital Structure   
Source: RiskMetrics Group - Corporate Governance Quotient (20th December 2007) 
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Table 2: Sample selection  
Panel A: Sample selection for H1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B: Sample selection for H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 No. of observations 
Initial sample from FactSet 2852 
Less: missing data on QCG 1275 
Equals: 1577 
Less: Missing data for accounting variables 63 
Final Sample 1514 
 No. of observations 
Initial sample from FactSet 2852 
Less: missing data on QCG 1275 
Equals: 1577 
Less: Missing data for accounting variables 72 
Final Sample 1505 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics for H1 
Variable Mean Std dev Min 
1st 
quartile Median 
3rd  
quartile Max 
Following 10.167 6.846 0 5 9 14 43 
CG 85.664 11.747 0 80.8 87.8 94.2 100 
NCG 17.767 1.801 6 17 18 19 20 
Board 4.399 0.708 1 4 5 5 5 
Compensation 4.099 0.999 1 4 4 5 5 
Takeover 4.782 0.653 1 5 5 5 5 
Audit 4.487 0.749 1 4 5 5 5 
Size 14.082 1.938 10.146 12.693 13.832 15.073 21.596 
Based on 1514 observations 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level; *=Significant at the 10% level 
Table 5: The association between corporate governance and analyst following (H1) 
Variable Expected Sign (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Intercept ? -0.303 -22.519* -2.288 -24.971* -0.865 7.349* 15.206* 3.939* 12.340* 1.116 -23.074* -18.249* -20.730* 
CG + 0.122* 0.061*            
NCG +   0.701* 0.419*          
Board +     2.508*     2.161* 0.792*   
Compensation +      0.688*   0.673* 0.413** 0.530*  0.624* 
Takeover +       -1.054*  -1.031* -0.835* -0.017   
Audit +        1.388*  0.412 0.145   
Size +  1.948*  1.966*       1.919* 2.018* 2.013* 
Adj-R
2
  4.34% 33.63% 3.34% 33.75% 6.67% 0.94% 0.95% 2.25% 1.85% 7.65% 33.98% 32.60% 33.38% 
N  1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 
*Without year dummy control variables (NCG is the sum of board, compensation, takeover, and audit), dependent variable is Analyst following. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = 
Significant at the 5% level; *=Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 Following CG NCG Board Compensation Takeover Audit Size 
Following 1 0.210* 0.184* 0.259* 0.100* -0.101* 0.152* 0.571* 
CG  1 0.712* 0.608* 0.391* 0.156* 0.480* 0.189* 
NCG   1 0.628* 0.655* 0.317* 0.660* 0.133* 
Board    1 0.147* -0.088* 0.446* 0.293* 
Compensation     1 -0.022 0.123* 0.016 
Takeover      1 0.001 -0.166* 
Audit       1 0.166* 
Size        1 
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Table 6: The association between corporate governance and analyst following (H1) 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Intercept 1.245 -23.132* -1.247 -25.286* -0.034 8.582* 12.594* 5.145* 10.301* -0.020 -24.343* -19.027* -21.339* 
CG 0.112* 0.058*            
NCG   0.693* 0.397*          
Board     2.302*     2.105* 0.763*   
Compensation      0.564*   0.576* 0.361** 0.463*  0.544* 
Takeover       -0.410  -0.455 -0.534*** 0.079   
Audit        1.238*  0.322 0.123   
Size  1.942*  1.951*       1.923* 2.002* 2.001* 
Year04 2.647* 2.852* 3.054* 3.058* 3.071* 3.083* 3.100* 3.077* 3.088* 3.068* 3.061* 3.081* 3.070* 
Year05 -0.539 1.667** -0.734 1.582** 0.217 -0.617 -0.355 -0.297 -0.130 0.937 1.956* 1.611** 1.776* 
Year06 -1.237 0.815 -1.495*** 0.691 -0.517 -1.486** -1.076 -0.824 -1.074 0.026 0.953 0.774 0.735 
Year07 -1.808** -0.033 -1.673** 0.065 -0.894 -1.569** -1.559 -1.626** -1.073 -0.047 0.521 -0.072 0.339 
Year08 -0.451 1.322** -1.190 0.920 0.201 -0.684 -0.216 -0.6689 -0.206 0.654 1.367*** 1.280** 1.243*** 
Adj-R
2
 6.47% 34.80% 5.96% 34.87% 8.26% 3.42% 2.92% 4.50% 3.49% 8.58% 34.95% 33.90% 34.42% 
N 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 1514 
With year dummy control variables. *** = significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level; *=Significant at the 10% level 
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Table 7: Descriptive statistics for H2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on 1505 observations 
Variable Mean Std dev Min 1st quartile Median 3rd quartile Max 
following 10.223 6.829 0 5 9 14 43 
CG 85.682 11.754 0 80 87.9 94.2 100 
NCG 17.768 1.802 6 17 18 19 20 
Board 4.398 0.708 1 4 5 5 5 
Compensation 
4.103 0.996 1 4 4 5 5 
Takeover 
4.781 0.655 1 5 5 5 5 
Audit 4.486 0.750 1 5 5 5 5 
size 14.082 1.940 10.146 12.693 13.830 15.067 21.597 
DA 0.237 0.190 0 0.083 0.219 0.349 1.672 
CA 0.050 0.056 0 0.015 0.037 0.065 0.860 
Q 0.501 2.123 -45.808 0.450 0.642 0.775 3.491 
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Table 8: Correlation Matrix 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level; *=Significant at the 10% level 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Following CG NCG Board Compensation Takeover Audit Size DA CA Q 
Following 1 0.209* 0.185* 0.263* 0.097* -0.098* 0.154* 0.575* 0.065** -0.063** -0.015 
CG  1 0.711* 0.608* 0.390* 0.157* 0.480* 0.191* 0.094* -0.012 0.001 
NCG   1 0.628* 0.656* 0.318* 0.660* 0.135* 0.074* -0.049*** -0.013 
Board    1 0.149* -0.0883* 0.444* 0.293* 0.111* -0.075* -0.004 
Compensation     1 -0.020 0.126* 0.021 0.040 0.007 -0.017 
Takeover      1 0.001 -0.166* -0.049*** 0.002 -0.013 
Audit       1 0.165* 0.062** -0.058** 0.007 
Size        1 0.195* -0.105* 0.055** 
DA         1 0.154* 0.056** 
CA          1 0.009 
Q           1 
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Table 9: The association between corporate governance, analyst following and firm value 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) 
Intercept -0.664 -0.939 -0.440 -1.003 -0.462 -0.572 -0.779 -0.619 -0.552 -0.687 -1.084 -0.750 -1.123 
CG -0.001 0.002 -0.018           
Following -0.021** 0.011 -0.020** 0.040 -0.020** -0.020** 0.005 -0.020** -0.027 -0.021** 0.011 -0.021** 0.022 
CGFollowing  -0.001            
NCG    0.014          
NCGFollowing    -0.003          
Board     -0.062 -0.053 -0.006       
Boardfollowing       -0.006       
Compensation     -0.026   -0.029 -0.045     
compfollowing         0.002     
Takeover     -0.015     -0.010 0.070   
Takefollowing           -0.009   
Audit     0.029       0.002 0.086 
Auditfollowing             -0.009 
Size 0.095* 0.095* 0.095* 0.095* 0.096* 0.098* 0.098* 0.094* 0.093* 0.094* 0.094* 0.094* 0.094* 
DA 0.480 0.481 0.487 0.482 0.492 0.490 0.485 0.482 0.482 0.475 0.484 0.475 0.459 
CA 0.290 0.282 0.264 0.289 0.265 0.252 0.270 0.292 0.290 0.289 0.292 0.292 0.308 
Adj-R
2
 0.5% 0.45% 0.52% 0.48% 0.35% 0.52% 0.47% 0.51% 0.45% 0.50% 0.46% 0.49% 0.48% 
N 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 1505 
*** = significant at the 1% level; ** = Significant at the 5% level; *=Significant at the 10% level 
 
